

ACTION

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

CC: D/ICS

DATE
DEC

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		/		
2	DDCI		/		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		/		
5	DDI				
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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
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		SUSPENSE _____ Date			

Remarks:

3637 (10-81)

Executive Secretary

Date

82-5275

LEG-4-1

14 JUN 1982

LOGGED

10 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] NSSD-2/82 Study Director

STAT

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSSD-2/82

This will take a lot of picking to put together. The defense is very comprehensive and very well organized but not very specific. I found the FBI quite good. I have indicated to you some questions I raised. The CIA one is rather spotty and the point very weak, for example, the treatment of defense against active measures. It seems to me the CIA responses are the most meager compared to the range of threat with which it has to deal. One critical task which, it seems to me, will need to be addressed is a discussion of the relative significance of the various threats, i.e., espionage/SIGINT, imagery/security, etc., and the relative effectiveness and cost of the various countermeasures. Everything can't be considered. Certainly everything can't be done at once. Therefore, the things that are most critical that can be addressed the most quickly and that will counter the critical threats most effectively need to be defined and tackled first. I haven't read the State paper. I will get around to that sometime.

C
William J. Casey

[REDACTED] STAT

SECRET